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Abstract 
 This thesis focuses on German playwright Bertolt Brecht’s second version of his play 
Galileo, which he worked on in collaboration with actor Charles Laughton during the fallout of 
the United States’ atomic bombings. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the playwright’s notion 
of the public intellectual in the play as an individual who should sacrifice everything to thwart 
injustices and acts of violence within society. This thesis argues that, while individuals comprise 
systems and institutions, those structural forms of state power also create and enforce limitations 
upon the personal agency of people who challenge their authority. By addressing these limits and 
the violence of repressive institutions or systems, this thesis criticizes the expectation of “heroic” 
resistance as a form of romanticized overdetermination of a scholar’s agency.  
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Introduction 
The invention of the atomic bomb, which effectively ended World War II, irreversibly 
altered perceptions about science. On those fateful days in August 1945, an estimated 115,000 
civilians tragically lost their lives in a single, horrifying flash of history.1 At least an additional 
100,000 people were left seriously injured in the wake of the United States’ attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (Bernstein 135). The weapon’s unfathomable caliber of destruction subsequently 
launched an international debate regarding the dangers of nuclear warfare, and led to a subgenre 
that John T. Dorsey terms “atomic bomb literature.” As a general characteristic noted by Dorsey, 
atomic bomb literature foregrounds the relationship between science and society, urging greater 
responsibility for scientists.2 During this literary movement, German playwright Bertolt Brecht 
collaborated with actor Charles Laughton to revise his play Leben des Galilei, renamed simply 
Galileo, between 1944 and 1947 in the midst of the atrocities of the atomic bomb. 
The original version of the play, first written in 1938, dramatized the well-known clash 
between Galileo Galilei’s cosmological theses and the Catholic Church’s doctrine, but the advent 
of the atomic bomb prompted the playwright to reexamine his original version and produce a 
new one which would engage with the current historical moment. As Brecht says in 
“Unvarnished Picture of a New Age,” his preamble to the second version, “Overnight the 
biography of the founder of the new system of physics read differently” (122). Not only does 
Galileo contribute to science that leads to the invention of the atomic bomb, but he also denies 
his theories under the Holy Inquisition’s interrogation, instead of standing up to the authorities. 
After this defeat, the play concludes with Andrea smuggling the Discorsi, a book which contains 
                                               
1  Some estimates of the death toll are closer to 250,000 or more (Berstein 135). 
2 John T. Dorsey explores this literary trend, highlighting numerous examples, such as C.P. Snow’s The 
New Men, Pearl Buck’s Command the Morning, Nagai Takashi’s The Bells of Nagasaki, and of course, 
Bertolt Brecht’s Galileo (Dorsey 277-290).  
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all of Galileo’s revolutionary new theories, out of Italy. In the original version, Andrea 
hoodwinks the guards and the group of boys with whom he interacts realize Old Marina is not 
actually a witch once Andrea tells them the truth, that a box they think the woman cursed 
belongs to him. The children believe him, and he confirms that society is, indeed, on the frontier 
of an age of reason with boundless possibilities for both scientific and social progress, which 
might lead to the invention of a flying broom—who knows! In the second version, Andrea holds 
one of the boys up to the woman’s window to see that a shadow in her house belongs to a soup 
ladle, not a flying broom. However, the boy denies the truth and rejoins the others in calling the 
woman a witch, signifying that an age of reason does not truly begin, all because Galileo did not 
persist in his effort against the Church. The playwright underscores the grim reality human 
civilization faced in the twentieth century, specifically a crisis of faith in civilization and the 
progress of society. In a period of rapid scientific development, why could these advancements 
result in such horrific atrocities as the human wreckage of the atomic bomb? Still, in the twenty-
first century, during an increasingly precarious nuclear age, we often find ourselves 
contemplating this question.  
The play’s dilemma between scientific advancement and catastrophe leads many critics 
to condemn Galileo for ultimately failing within his social role as a scientist. According to these 
readings, since Galileo submits to the ruling class of his time and practices science mainly out of 
self-interest, he allows the Catholic Church to continue exploiting scientific discoveries and 
oppressing people in society. For example, Jacqueline Merriam-Paskow states, “[Galileo] denies 
the awaiting populace living under the shadow of the Inquisition the momentously liberating 
political and social implications of his discovery” (42). M.A. Cohen briefly notes the Marxist 
influence on Brecht’s representation of the seventeenth-century physicist; he argues that Brecht 
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portrays Galileo as a “forerunner of modern science and social revolutions,” who chiefly desires 
to “spread the spirit of doubt,” because he believes this subversive attitude will lead other people 
in his society to alter the existing social order (88). Cohen interprets the historical moment in the 
play as “one in which reason might have begun to control human affairs,” instead of a few 
powerful individuals; he refers to Galileo’s recantation of his scientific discoveries toward the 
end of the play, therefore, as the “ultimate betrayal of a new age” on the grounds that the 
scientist turns his back on all the promises of an age of reason, allowing the ruling system to 
continue exploiting the lower classes (83). Brecht himself openly expressed his unforgiving view 
of his title character, whose decision to concede under the Catholic Church’s pressures thwarted 
the social responsibility of the intellectual in the playwright’s perspective: “The fact is that 
Galileo enriched astronomy and physics by simultaneously robbing these sciences of a greater 
part of their social importance” (Journals 123). Günter Rohrmoser further expands upon the 
repercussions of Galileo’s socially negligent actions, summarily purporting that “[m]odern 
science, in itself an instrument of progress, transforms itself into a force for oppression in the 
hands of the rulers to whom Galileo has delivered himself” (65-66). Assertions such as these, 
however, appear to rely on the assumption that when individuals pursue scientific discoveries 
with a socially conscientiousness mindset, those developments will inevitably benefit everyone 
in society. The problem with this premise is that even if an individual practices science with the 
altruistic intention of helping everyone, that does not mean an authority above them cannot 
exercise the power to utilize that invention or knowledge in a destructive manner, with or 
without the scientist’s permission. The responsibility of controlling scientific advancements 
should not and cannot possibly rest entirely on the individual scientist. 
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While these harsh criticisms are appropriate in acknowledging the class struggle in the 
play as well as the responsibility of the intellectual, they do not fully examine the position of 
Galileo within the violent system that also targets him. Without this consideration, we can easily 
overlook the oppressive nature of the authority that operated against the scientists who 
constructed the atomic bomb as well. This risks misplacing fault solely on the scientists, instead 
of also holding the political systems under which they followed orders accountable. Moreover, 
this interpretation oversimplifies the impossibility of Galileo’s situation as he confronts the 
oppressive system operating against him. It is important to foreground the underlying violence of 
the institution in the play, as this raises an intriguing question about our capacity to prevent 
injustices carried out on an institutional level in society. How far can we really ask a person to go 
to stop acts of violence? And how far can one person really go? Rather than simply vilifying or 
exonerating the character of Galileo, I wish to propose a new reading of the play. I will argue 
that Brecht unwittingly suggests the extensive limits of personal agency when confronting 
structural forms of power, which undercuts romanticized societal expectations of “heroic” 
resistance, even those which the playwright himself endorses. 
 
Brecht’s Marxist Aesthetic, Epic Theatre, and Political Views 
 Before analyzing Brecht’s work, we first need to understand the sociopolitical factors that 
informed his worldview and inspired his revolutionary practice of epic theatre. During his six-
year exile from Germany, life in the United States did not prove very successful for the brilliant 
playwright. This was mainly due to Brecht’s resistance toward more popular theatre styles of the 
time, his unwavering political opinions, which he dedicated his entire career to publicizing, and 
his obstinate personality. As author James K. Lyon explains in his biographical novel Bertolt 
Brecht in America, “[a]lmost without exception, those who perceived Brecht to be dictatorial 
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experienced these traits in connection with his political ideologies or his theatrical ideas” (89). 
Specifically, Brecht implemented a didactic model, based on the “Theatre of Enlightenment,” 
which aims to illuminate social power structures and emphatically call attention to the class 
struggle as well as the “irrationality” of oppressive power dynamics (Fehervary 100). The 
Theatre of Enlightenment model also incorporates a concept called “the great truth,” which 
Brecht described in his own words:  
The great truth of our time is that our continent is giving way to barbarism 
because private ownership of the means of production is being maintained by 
violence. Merely to recognize this truth is not sufficient, but should it not be 
recognized, no other truth of importance can be discovered. Of what use is it to 
write something courageous which shows that the condition into which we are 
falling is barbarous (which is true) if it is not clear why we are falling into this 
condition? (qtd. in Fehervary 80).  
In discussing the state of Europe as falling into “barbarism,” Brecht does not imply “civilization” 
as a necessary counterpart, a binary which Walter Benjamin cautions us to avoid. As Benjamin 
wisely reminds us, “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism” (256). This problematic binary allows certain societies to vilify or 
subordinate cultures that are different from their own.3 Rather, Brecht insinuates that Europe has 
not yet reached a “civilized” time at all, and he makes an excellent point about the violent means 
of capitalism which oppress the proletariat; capitalist production is not progress for everyone in 
society as Marx would agree. The playwright does not subscribe to a conception of history in 
                                               
3 For example, consider early European settlers’ perception, and subsequent cruel treatment, of 
indigenous peoples, colonialist invasions of Africa during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or 
the xenophobic views of Eastern cultures which persist in the Western world.  
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which events of the twentieth century appear as a singular, horrific exception to an otherwise 
“civilized” time in European culture. On the contrary, in acknowledging the violence within his 
society, Brecht correctly implies that violence is not the opposite of progress in capitalist society, 
but the crux of it. As Benjamin and Brecht both seem to understand, violence continues to occur 
because we ignore and enforce it in the name of so-called “progress.” It is crucial to remember 
this murky territory as we look at the behavior of Galileo, a victim of violence in a society 
seemingly on the brink of “enlightenment” or an age of reason. 
In order to force audiences to engage with issues of bourgeois society, Brecht 
implemented a style called epic theatre, which attempts to shock viewers and alienate them from 
the story so they can objectively critique the current social situation the narrative presents 
(Kellner 31-35). Unlike dramatic styles of theatre, such as the Aristotelian model, epic theatre 
does not promote empathy toward characters, because empathy allows the audience to passively 
view the social situations in the play as unchangeable (Brecht, Theatre 137-137). Epic theatre, 
according to Brecht, strives to depict the world “not only for the contemplative human being but 
also for the active human being, ie the world is conceived of as alterable” (Journals 110). In 
other words, when an audience can perceive the needlessness of a character’s suffering and the 
processes that lead to it, they can then go out into the world to alter this reality for themselves 
and others. On a world stage that had seemingly reached peaks in scientific development and 
“civilization,” Brecht tirelessly spotlighted the darker underbelly of a society ruled by the upper 
classes in a bourgeois society or domineering, myopic political systems that control scientific 
advancements without considering the long-term consequences for people in the lower classes of 
society. In typical Brechtian (and Marxist) fashion, however, the playwright tends to privilege 
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the suffering of the collective proletariat and his political aims over the repression of the 
individual in his play.4 
 
Synopsis of Galileo and Brecht’s Artistic Goals  
With the playwright’s Marxist views and deeply political style of theatre in mind, let us 
explore what Brecht aims to accomplish with his art in Galileo. The story focuses on the real 
historical figure of Galileo Galilei, a revolutionary scientific thinker in the seventeenth century 
during the Roman Catholic Inquisition. Specifically, the drama revolves around the scientist’s 
crucial discovery of the heliocentric model of the universe, which subverts the Church’s religious 
doctrine of the time. At the beginning of the play, we gather that Galileo pursues science in 
different capacities: first, as a tutor for young people who pay him for private lessons on 
astronomy; second, as an employed professor of mathematics who offers scientific inventions to 
the Great Arsenal of Venice for merchants and manufacturers to sell; and third, as an 
independent researcher who desperately craves to satisfy his own curiosities about the universe. 
Within this last capacity, Galileo’s pursuit of the ‘truth’ about the heliocentric model challenges 
orthodox beliefs, placing him at odds with the Catholic Church after he moves to Florence. 
While the Church reigns supreme, the vast majority of people in Galileo’s society, including 
him, struggle to earn a living wage. By contrast, the Church officials and members of the upper 
classes lead comfortable lives with an excess of wealth. The Church’s rigorous enforcement of 
the social order, however, ensures that none dare speak out against this imbalance of power. The 
ghost-like presence of Giordano Bruno, another real historical figure whom the Church executed 
for supporting the same theory Galileo proves, hovers in the play imbuing the ever-present fear 
                                               
4 In his book Intellectuals, Paul Johnson mentions Brecht’s tendency in real life, as well as his fiction, to 
view people or characters as less important than his “ideas” (196). 
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of the Holy Inquisition that firmly holds society at bay. Despite warnings from Church officials, 
Galileo daringly publishes his theory in the vernacular, a pivotal decision which makes his 
teachings widely accessible for people in the revolutionary lower classes of society who could 
not otherwise read Latin, the language of the classically educated upper classes. The scientist’s 
publication subsequently raises all sorts of provocative, dangerous questions about the 
established social order and truth. Some townspeople deem him a “Bible-killer,” and the Holy 
Inquisition orders his arrest for undermining the Catholic Church’s authority.  
It is precisely Galileo’s position as an enemy of the Church that reveals the limits of 
personal agency the scientist experiences. The character’s conflict with the Church culminates in 
his recantation of heliocentrism out of fear for his life when an Inquisitor menacingly shows him 
a room filled with instruments of torture, a scene which the playwright tellingly chooses not to 
explicitly show us. By glossing over the extreme violence in this moment, Brecht turns our 
attention away from the individual under repression, figuratively shutting us out from the 
character’s personal suffering. The Church then sentences Galileo to house arrest for the rest of 
his life, but he cannot resist secretly continuing his scientific work, and eventually completes his 
Discorsi. Although Galileo finishes this significant accomplishment, he dwells on his misdeeds 
as a scientist whose contributions to the scientific field and cowardly actions inexcusably failed 
to benefit the people in society suffering under the Church’s authority. However, the character’s 
dedication to science does not come without a personal sacrifice in the play either; Galileo is 
nearly blind toward the end of his life because of constantly exposing his eyes to the sunspots he 
studies. We might view the character’s blindness as a metaphor for his blindness toward the 
repercussions of his socially negligent pursuit of science, but this interpretation once again 
overlooks the suffering the character endures. In the final act, Galileo’s friend and student, 
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Andrea, smuggles the Discorsi out of Italy in the hope of spreading these new ideas around the 
world, but Brecht leaves us pondering the inevitable misuses of science by those in power, 
whose authority Galileo inadvertently solidifies by recanting, which will continue to oppress 
people in new ways.  
The resolution of the play reflects the playwright’s conception of history which 
acknowledges that “progress” in capitalist society occurs only at the expense of the proletariat. In 
Galileo, Brecht harkens back to an actual moment in history before the age that Europeans often 
regard as the period of “Enlightenment.” Brecht’s Marxist perspective helps explain his 
frustration with Galileo as an intellectual. According to Brecht, the play’s Galileo fails not only 
when he recants, but also when he practices science under house arrest later in life; the 
playwright states, “[Galileo’s] productiveness destroys him,” and continues, “Galileo destroyed 
not only himself as a person, but also the most valuable part of his scientific work. The church 
(ie the authorities) defended the biblical doctrine simply in order to maintain itself, its authority, 
its capacity to oppress and exploit” (Journals 308). The crucial aspect of Galileo’s scientific 
work, for Brecht, is its ability to challenge the Catholic Church’s assumed authority which 
allows them to remain at the top of society. Rather than galvanizing a social movement, the 
character’s recantation of his unorthodox theory undermines this revolutionary attitude and 
enables the Church to reinforce its position of power. Moreover, since Galileo continues to 
pursue science despite the Church’s consolidated rule, the playwright implicates the character in 
furthering scientific “progress” which will benefit the upper classes, but inversely prove 
detrimental to the rest of society. Brecht utilizes the real historical moment in the play to flip the 
capitalist notion of “progress” completely on its head. In the original version, Galileo expresses 
the belief that his society is indeed on the brink of a “new time” (Brecht, Life 6). The second 
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version of the play, on the other hand, urges a new perception of history; Galileo skeptically 
claims from the onset of the story, “A new age was coming” (Brecht, Galileo 48, my emphasis), 
and later says, “This age of ours turned out to be a whore, spattered with blood” (124). I agree 
with Cohen’s assertion that Brecht seems less concerned with historical accuracy than reflecting 
issues within modern society, mainly the violence of capitalism and the responsibility of the 
intellectual: “the point is more for the present than about the past. Confronted by the drama in 
performance, we meet Galileo’s dilemmas as our own” (86). In a Sartrean view of committed 
literature, which seeks to create social change, Brecht is giving voice to “freedoms which are 
swallowed up, masked, and unavailable” to the lower classes in his own twentieth-century 
society, pleading his fellow citizens to recognize the oppressive nature of the system in which 
they live and play an active role in reshaping the world (Sartre 67).  
The issue with Brecht’s vision of the play, and the interpretation many critics bolster, is 
that the playwright places the task of emancipating people in society squarely on Galileo’s 
shoulders. Brecht unwittingly invites a discussion about accountability of oppressive systems, 
however, when the protagonist states after recanting, “Unhappy is the land that needs a hero” 
(Brecht, Galileo 115). Although the playwright insists that Galileo should act against the Church, 
even if that entails sacrificing his life, this simple utterance momentarily shifts the focus back 
onto the authorities that oppress him. We must then ask if Galileo martyring himself would have 
truly prevented the Church’s future misuses of science.  
 
Theoretical Background  
The social and political theories of Karl Marx lay the groundwork for a conversation 
about Brecht’s goal of social change that he projects onto Galileo in the play. At the base of 
Marx’s influential theories about social relations and change lies his concept called “historical 
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materialism.” Historical materialism is Marx’s approach to understanding the course of history 
as a series of developments in the ‘means of production’ (e.g. machines, factories, and the 
organized labor force). According to Marx, this constant revolutionizing of the material means 
and modes of production shapes ‘relations of production’ between the private owners of that 
production (capitalists) and the workers (proletariat) as well as the “whole relations of society” 
(“Communist Manifesto” 659). Through the collective labor-power of the workers, the capitalist 
places the products of that labor on the market for consumption. In the act of exchange, these 
products adopt a social nature; people begin to assign the products of human labor intrinsic 
value, measurable by the product’s relation to other things, instead of recognizing the labor of 
individual workers as a mark of value, a phenomenon which Marx terms the ‘fetishism’ of 
commodities (Capital 165). To gain an economic advantage, furthermore, the capitalist will 
increase their labor-power in highly exploitative ways to compete with others in the market and 
increase their profit.5 Marx predicts that this widening gulf between the wealth of the bourgeoisie 
and the poor conditions of the proletariat will inevitably lead to a social revolution and the 
collapse of Capitalism. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx alludes to 
the “legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophie--in short ideological forms in which men 
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out,” but does not sufficiently elaborate on the 
exact way in which the proletariat will gain this “class consciousness” required to change the 
social order (12).  
Walter Benjamin expands upon Marx’s revolutionary claims and concept of historical 
materialism, addressing the vital moment when the oppressed or revolutionary class becomes 
aware of their ability to take action. Whereas the historicist “gives the ‘eternal’ image of the 
                                               
5 Marx specifically addresses the practices of child employment, prolongation of the work day, and the 
intensification of labor (Capital 517-542). 
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past,” says Benjamin, “the [historical materialist] recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of 
happening, or...a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. He takes cognizance of 
it in order to blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history” (263). For Benjamin 
as with Brecht, “the attempt must be made anew,” in every epoch of history, “to wrest tradition 
away from a conformism that is about to overpower it” (255). On whom does the task of this 
‘Messianic’ intervention in history fall, though? Benjamin concurs with Marx that the oppressed 
class as a whole will fulfil this prophecy, mainly out of hatred and the “spirit of sacrifice” (260).  
Other political and philosophical theorists discuss the influence of the intellectual in this 
struggle against violence and oppressive institutions. In his 1993 Reith Lectures, Edward Said 
speaks about the invaluable role of the public intellectual in every revolutionary or 
counterrevolutionary movement in modern history. He defines a ‘public intellectual’ as more 
than a mere profession and rather as “an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, 
embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, 
the public,” whose specific role in society is to “publicly raise embarrassing questions, to 
confront orthodoxy and dogma” (11). Said argues that the intellectual, driven by their raison 
d'être, will courageously protest infringements upon the standards of freedom and justice which 
every person should rightfully demand from governing bodies or nations (12). As we see in the 
play, Brecht clearly views Galileo as a public intellectual who embodies the revolutionary 
attitude of people in his society and occupies a position from which he can convey this message 
to the public. As a prominent scientific thinker, Galileo emboldens people to “teach new things,” 
as one of his supporters, an iron founder and member of the lower working class named Matti, 
tells him (Brecht, Galileo 105). Whether it be unorthodox theories about science or ideas about 
reforming social relations, the questions Galileo raises confront the legitimacy of the Catholic 
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Church’s rule. Said’s definition of the public intellectual, however, adds more nuance to Brecht’s 
treatment of the character as a mere figurehead of a movement who should lay down his life for 
the cause; he claims that the public intellectual always faces an inherent personal risk in speaking 
out in public about controversial issues (13). When examining Galileo’s position and 
responsibility as an intellectual, this is a factor that we must consider. 
Both Brecht and Said’s conception of the public intellectual taps into an earlier Kantian 
notion of the ‘public use’ of reason which the philosopher examines as an instrumental tool for 
the betterment of society. Although Kant’s theory of enlightenment does not support revolutions 
as an effective method of social change, it attempts to explain how the use of reason might 
reform society.6 According to Kant, people live in a state of “self-incurred minority;” the 
philosopher defines minority as the “inability to use one’s understanding without direction from 
another,” and says that this social condition is self-incurred when “its cause lies not in lack of 
understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction” (600). In other 
words, Kant maintains that people possess the ability to think for themselves, but oftentimes 
depend upon the instructions of others who will think for them instead: “It is so comfortable to 
be immature! If I have a book that understands for me, a spiritual advisor who has a conscience 
for me, a doctor who decides upon a regimen for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at 
all. I need not think, if only I can pay” (600). It is not difficult to see how this idea of “self-
incurred” minority might allow people to view those in the oppressed lower classes as 
“complacent” for their conditions in life. Within the context of Brecht’s and Benjamin’s 
conceptions of history, Kant’s theory of enlightenment also lies at the heart of the binary 
between “civilization” and “barbarism” which allows Europe to claim it has reached an 
                                               
6 Marx clearly envisions this reshaping of society as the replacement of Capitalism with the Communist 
mode of production.  
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enlightened age, while regarding other cultures as “unenlightened” or “barbarous.” I recognize 
that Kant’s hesitance toward revolutionary action and sole emphasis on improving the mindset of 
people in society does not necessarily fit with Brecht’s or Marx’s theories and practice of active 
social resistance. The philosopher plainly argues that “a revolution may well bring about the 
falling off of personal despotism and of avaricious or tyrannical oppression, but never a true 
reform in one’s way of thinking” (601). But perhaps, these theories can inform each other in a 
way which elucidates how the use of independent reason can help confront the injustices or 
forms of oppression which lie at the fore of Brecht’s work. 
I agree with Kant’s notion of enlightenment in the sense that it is a gradual, constant 
reevaluation of assumed truths or “precepts and formulas” that subdue people in society and 
“harness the great unthinking masses” (600-601). In this regard, the philosopher’s theories are 
not totally incompatible with Brecht’s goal of implementing his art to incite social change. For 
society to truly move toward an enlightened age, wherein people can think freely for themselves, 
Kant asserts that everyone must be allowed to use their reason publicly in all matters within the 
role that he terms a ‘scholar.’ In addressing their community as a whole, every person should 
raise the uncomfortable, contentious questions which combat the mistakes or abuses of those in 
power. This is the failure for which Brecht faults Galileo in the play. If individuals can perform 
this fundamental role, according to Kant, people will emerge from a state of minority. However, 
the philosopher notes the restrictions on this freedom in an immature society which do not allow 
people to use their reason freely in public. As we observe in the play, the Catholic Church does 
not allow Galileo to speak out against its abuses of power in several insidious, sometimes covert 
ways. Through this theoretical and philosophical lens, we can view Galileo as a public 
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intellectual, but one in an extremely repressive system that primarily seeks to serve its own 
interests and perpetuate its authority by crushing any form of public opposition. 
 
Critical Analysis of Galileo  
Considering the aftermath of the atomic bomb, especially in the United States, Brecht’s 
Galileo echoes the anti-nuclear sentiments and historical conditions after World War II. 
Speaking to his friend and pupil, Andrea, at the beginning of the play, Galileo voices an anti-
establishment feeling shared by anti-nuclear protesters: “The millennium of faith is ended, said I, 
this is the millennium of doubt. And we are pulling out of that contraption. The sayings of the 
wise men won’t wash any more. Everybody, at last, is getting nosy” (Brecht, Galileo 49). The 
notion of escaping a “contraption” implies a struggle within Galileo’s society between the public 
and the ruling class or system of thought. The Church’s upheld religious doctrine, based on the 
“sayings of wise men,” restricts the public’s inquiries about scientific pursuits. Galileo implicates 
members of the Church and upper classes of society, for example, in allowing humankind to 
continue misguidedly thinking that “the sun and all the host of stars revolve around [them]” for 
two thousand years (48). In contrast, the character expresses his utmost confidence in the 
everyday person, “the sailor, carpenter, and so on,” who does not fear “using their eyes,” to 
harness their healthy dose of doubt so they can realize and rectify the foolish errors of the 
Church (69). This group of ‘everyday people,’ in a way, represents the social class that Marx 
calls the ‘proletariat,’ the revolutionary class which he predicts will eventually overthrow the 
bourgeoisie. In that same vein, we understand the greater, implicit threat this doubt poses to the 
Catholic Church’s assumed authority. As Galileo considers traveling to Florence to share his 
revolutionary scientific discoveries with Prince De’Medici, his friend Sagredo implores, “How 
can people in power leave a man at large who tells the truth, even if it be the truth about the 
 
 
20 
 
distant stars?” (65). Not only does Galileo speak the truth about science, but Sagredo recognizes 
that his friend could implement his doubt to “speak truth to power,” as Said would say, 
questioning the uncontested dogma and authority of those in power. As a public intellectual, 
Galileo articulates the opposition of the lower classes to the ruling system’s orthodox beliefs and 
authority.  
Dario Fazzi helps explain the significance of this public doubt for an audience in the late 
twentieth century. After World War II, the Truman Administration supported the “widely 
accepted doctrine” of “nuclear deterrence,” the strategy that the United States needed to continue 
developing the most powerful nuclear weapons in the world to prevent other countries from 
detonating their own (Fazzi 699). Not to mention, the nuclear arms race aimed to combat 
communism, playing into the mounting fear of communism and communists, which eventually 
culminated in the Cold War. This advancement of nuclear technology elicited many concerns 
from the public and those within the scientific community. Some people claimed that nuclear 
weapons ensured greater dangers, rather than any sense of international safety. During this 
conversation about nuclear energy, the AEC (US Atomic Energy Commission) General Advisory 
Committee declared that the invention of a “super-bomb” would threaten the future of the entire 
human race. Truman ignored these warnings, however, deeming any opposition “foolhardy 
altruism,” but that did not dissuade the public or scientific community from questioning the 
irresponsible use of nuclear power due to the Administration’s dogmatic objectives (Fazzi 702). 
According to Fazzi, Eleanor Roosevelt spearheaded a national campaign about the implications 
of nuclear warfare after World War II, and endeavored to merge nuclear criticism within the 
scientific community with the wisdom of the general public to challenge the Administration. 
Eleanor Roosevelt and the scientific community’s efforts to stoke the public’s doubt and prevent 
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the Administration from misusing science closely parallels Galileo’s belief in the everyday 
person to oppose the Catholic Church’s claims about science in the play. For example, Galileo 
asks the group of scholars he meets in Florence why they “defend shaken teachings,” then tells 
them that people in the lower classes will eventually depose these faulty beliefs and humiliate 
members of the upper class: “The question is whether these gentlemen here want to be found out 
as fools by men who might not have had the advantages of a classical education...I tell you that 
our dockyards are stirring with the same high curiosity which was the true glory of ancient 
Greece” (Brecht, Galileo 69). The future of science and society, for Galileo, lies not with the 
narrow-minded members of the upper class, but with these ‘everyday people’ or the proletariat. 
Like his twentieth-century counterparts, Galileo appropriately identifies the moment in history as 
a time for society to challenge the ruling class or institutions.  
Perhaps more interestingly, the United States’ earliest attempt to grant the public control 
over nuclear energy after World War II through the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
ultimately failed in many regards, an outcome which rings true in the play as well. The AEC, 
despite its initial goal to “promote world peace” and “improve the public welfare,” quickly 
morphed into a national defense operation (Buck 1). In the first seven years after its conception, 
the civilian-controlled Commission began contracting private corporations to manage nuclear 
power plants and laboratories, a practice the Government previously reserved for national 
emergencies in times of war (Buck 2-3). Only after the Commission obtained an adequate 
arsenal of uranium to suit “military needs” did it finally start focusing on the peaceful aims of 
nuclear energy which it originally set out to pursue (Buck 6). The final scene of the play 
similarly undercuts the idea that the public can prevent the exploitation of science. Before 
smuggling Galileo’s Discorsi out of Italy, Andrea encounters a group of boys who insist that a 
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woman in the town called ‘old Marina’ is a witch who flies around on a broomstick. In the 
original version, Andrea simply tells the boys they “should learn to use [their] eyes,” and that a 
machine which would permit a person to fly on a stick does not yet exist (Brecht, Life 109). The 
original version of the play ends on a fairly optimistic note, reaffirming the belief in the everyday 
person to utilize their doubt to challenge misconceptions and the Church. In the second version, 
by contrast, Andrea provides the boys with concrete evidence which disproves their accusations 
about the woman. Holding one of the boys up to the woman’s window, Andrea allows him to see 
that a shadow which resembles a flying broomstick to the boys belongs to a mundane soup ladle. 
Even after witnessing this proof, the boy still cries out with added fervor, “She is a witch! She is 
a witch!” (Brecht, Galileo 128). The young boy’s denial of the truth, despite the evidence, 
contradicts Galileo’s earlier convictions that the public can implement their doubt and reason to 
guide the advancement of science in a socially responsible manner. From this revision of the 
final scene and the real historical context which informed it, the possibility of committed 
scientific pursuits that aim to benefit humankind while resisting exploitation, even under the 
public’s supervision, seems increasingly improbable.  
 For this socially irresponsible mindset of people, Brecht blames Galileo for failing within 
his social role as an intellectual, reflecting the historical concerns in the United States about the 
role and responsibility of the scientist following World War II. At the beginning of the play, 
Galileo presents his invention of the telescope to The Great Arsenal of Venice and profusely 
announces his complete allegiance to the Catholic Church; he describes himself as their 
“obedient servant” who “has always counted it his privilege to offer [them] such discoveries and 
inventions as might prove lucrative to the manufacturers and merchants of [the] Venetian 
Republic” (Brecht, Galileo 55). An historical parallel immediately appears between Galileo and 
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the scientists who worked on the atomic bomb under allegiance to the United States government. 
Rather than considering the other possible benefits or ramifications for society, the scientist 
readily offers scientific advancements to the institution without thinking about the public. 
Galileo trades his invention for monetary gain, affirming this selfish motivation and socially 
irresponsible attitude: “I have no patience…with a man who doesn’t use his brains to fill his 
belly” (64). This brash declaration conveys the character’s self-centered outlook as well as the 
capitalist undertones evident in his actions, which Brecht clearly wants to emphasize throughout 
the play. Galileo’s desire to gain a profit for his intellectual work distracts him in many ways 
from considering the societal implications of that work.  
John T. Dorsey notes that this depiction falls within other Faustian portrayals of scientists 
in postwar literary works—especially those written by German playwrights—after the atomic 
bomb’s ruination. According to Dorsey, part of this archetype entails that the scientist essentially 
“makes a deal with the Devil,” ignoring the consequences of their discoveries in exchange for 
worldly rewards (278). In Galileo’s case, the Catholic Church operates as the “Devil,” and the 
Administration that commissioned the development of the atomic bomb functioned in a similar 
way by displacing moral judgment with nationalistic, worldly concerns for the scientists 
involved. Literary works before the war nationalistically encouraged the scientific community to 
construct weapons that would defend their country, whereas works following the atomic bomb 
captured the essence of a movement that promoted responsibility for scientists. The play’s 
negative depiction of Galileo as an intellectual who aligns himself with Authority instead of 
society clearly represents the latter model for an audience in postwar United States. 
Aside from surrendering his inventions to the Catholic Church, Galileo also expresses 
materialistic desires consistently over the course of the play, another factor which adds to the 
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character’s complicit behavior. For instance, the scientist explains to his friend Sagredo, “And I 
like to buy books—all kinds of books. Why not? And what about my appetite? I don’t think well 
unless I eat well. Can I help it if I get my best ideas over a good meal and a bottle of wine?” 
(Brecht 61). Not only do these lines reflect Galileo’s lack of concern for the social applications 
of science, but this statement also incorporates an element of the Marxist dialectic which 
includes “the principles of historical specification, critique, and revolutionary practice” (Kellner 
30). To promote revolutionary practice and critique capitalist society, Brecht attempts to 
showcase the perspectives and behaviors that individuals develop based on social classes 
(Kellner 31). As an individual of a society that reflects a bourgeois system, Galileo 
unapologetically seeks and savors the finer pleasures in life, which outweigh his desires to 
challenge the status quo within society. As the scientist puts it, “I cherish the consolations of the 
flesh. I have no patience with cowards who call them weaknesses. I say there is a certain 
achievement in enjoying things” (Brecht 92). Galileo clearly subscribes to the capitalist notion of 
“achievement” or “progress” as economic or materialistic gain. The character exhibits the 
behaviors and attitudes of an individual who values worldly pleasures, which somewhat prevents 
him from fulfilling his responsibility to dispute the social order.  
Galileo’s self-preserving and indulgent tendencies, moreover, make it exceptionally 
difficult for him to look out for anyone except himself in the end. Anthony Squiers examines this 
‘split character’ technique in Brecht’s work, which incorporates the Marxist differentiation 
between “individual-being” and “species-being” (103). Even though Galileo wants to remain 
loyal to the truth about his scientific discoveries, his duty to himself triumphs against his duties 
to the scientific field and society as a whole, a direct result of the antagonistic nature of 
bourgeois society. Thus, Brecht depicts Galileo as an individual who largely neglects his 
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responsibility as a man of society to change the existing social order and invites the audience to 
criticize the character’s actions which mirror those of scientists in modern society. Surely, we 
cannot condemn Galileo for simply wanting to enjoy a painless life, a savory meal, and books, 
though. Of course, people should actively confront injustices within society, but we cannot 
ignore the rigid systems that exert such an unshakeable force upon people while pointing fingers 
accusingly at individuals trying to survive within that system. 
Toward the end of the script, Galileo’s submission to the Church under intimidation 
further portrays him as a failure within his social role as a scientist. Despite knowing the truth 
about the heliocentric model of the universe, he retracts his findings and seemingly allows the 
Church to continue exerting their power over society. Years after his defeat, Galileo thoroughly 
reproaches himself for this choice:  
I take it that the intent of science is to ease human existence. If you give way to 
coercion, science can be crippled, and your new machines may simply suggest 
new drudgeries…At that particular time, had one man put up a fight, it could have 
had wide repercussions…I surrendered my knowledge to the powers that be, to 
use it, no, not use it, to abuse it, as it suits their ends. (Brecht, Galileo 124) 
In a didactic manner, Brecht utilizes this final monologue of Galileo’s to speak to the audience 
about the dangers of individuals, especially scientists, mindlessly following orders of powerful 
systems. Since Galileo does not remain faithful to the integrity of his scientific discoveries, 
Brecht seems to suggest that he allows the ruling class to undermine the socially conscientious 
applications of science. In a similar manner, the scientists working on the atomic bomb arguably 
allowed the United States government to take advantage of their intellect and harness it in 
whatever way fit their interests. A statement by Robert J. Oppenheimer, one of the most 
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notorious scientists who forged the atomic bomb, reflects the exact concerns Galileo comes to 
understand too late: “the experiences of this century…have shown in a poignant way how much 
the applications of science determine our welfare and that of our fellows” (qtd. in Schweber 178-
179). Since Galileo permits the Church to repress his scientific discoveries, maintaining 
ownership of scientific pursuits, Brecht claims that the character “jeopardise[s] true progress,” 
and that “astronomy revert[s] to being just another scientific subject, the domain of experts, 
apolitical, isolated,” ultimately capable of repressing society as a whole (Journals 308). Through 
Galileo’s self-indictment of his neglected responsibilities as a scientist, Brecht illustrates that the 
quest for knowledge must never divorce societal implications to a postwar audience struggling to 
comprehend the fallout of the atomic bomb. If that schism occurs, knowledge leads to dangerous 
consequences, such as the bomb’s calamitous effects for the civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
as well as the rippling fear of nuclear warfare. The question remains, however, whether we can 
hold the individual solely accountable for these applications of science when institutions or 
political systems demand such compliance under strict orders.  
On several occasions, we see that the repressive system in which Galileo lives also 
exploits him as a worker for the upper class in his society. At the beginning of the play, the 
Curator mentions one of Galileo’s previous inventions which impressed the Chamber of 
Commerce, and tells the scientist that he should create something else with “practical” use which 
will increase the wealth of the businessmen in his society (Brecht, Galileo 53). Unlike the group 
of businessmen who profit from Galileo’s labor, the scientist repeatedly mentions that he needs 
money; he expresses to his friend, Sagredo, “[The Senators] don’t pay me as much as they pay 
the butcher’s boy” (61), and later tells his daughter, “The only way a man like me can land a 
good job is by crawling on his stomach” (64). Marx and Engels examine this degradation of the 
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scholar’s role to a simple “wage-laborer” in bourgeois society, a position which Galileo clearly 
holds. As the theoreticians explain, capitalist society nefariously dissolves emotional or familial 
relations between people into “naked self-interest” and “callous ‘cash payment’” (“Communist 
Manifesto” 659). We witness this effect during Galileo’s business dealings at the Great Arsenal 
of Venice. Throughout the scene, Brecht includes numerous references to economic gain which 
illustrate Marx and Engels’s point. When Galileo presents the telescope, for instance, the Curator 
proclaims to the officials, “Mr. Galilei has generously handed this fresh product of his teeming 
brain entirely over to you, allowing you to manufacture as many of these highly salable articles 
as you please” (Brecht 56). In contrast to the immense wealth the upper class stands to gain, 
Sagredo whispers to Galileo that he can now simply afford to pay his bills. The second Galileo 
ventures to insinuate that the telescope is “more than a money-making gadget,” a tool which 
could be used for purposes beyond the capitalist aims of increasing profit for the upper classes, 
the Curator promptly interrupts him (56). The prospect of money seems only an afterthought to 
Galileo in this moment; he responds somewhat disinterestedly after the Curator reminds him of 
his payment, stating, “Pardon? What? Of course” (57). As a revolutionary thinker, Galileo 
understands the potential of the instrument for more than merely economic advancement. The 
Arsenal and Curator’s careless dismissal of his ideas, however, prove that they view him as 
nothing more than a laborer, whose knowledge they can literally employ to further their own 
agenda. In this manner, Galileo represents the “oppressed” worker to an extent in the lower class 
who contributes to the wealth of his “oppressors” in the upper class.  
Furthermore, the character’s estrangement from the wealth and products of his own labor 
exemplifies Marx’s notion of ‘alienation.’ The playwright’s use of the word “product” in 
referring to Galileo’s inventions reflects the capitalist overtones in the scene. According to Marx, 
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the alienation of the worker “means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external 
existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it 
becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on 
the object confronts him as something hostile and alien” (Marx, Economic 29). As a worker for 
the upper class, Galileo’s intellectual work morphs into an external object for the capitalists in 
his society to sell as a commodity to whomever they choose. The capitalists own the products of 
the worker’s labor, and moreover, largely determine the applications of those products. When the 
Curator suggests that Galileo make something with the same “practical” use as his previous 
invention, he notes the army’s use of the efficient mathematical chart (Brecht, Galileo 53). The 
Curator’s interruption of Galileo similarly points to the militant use of the telescope which will 
allow the Republic of Venice to detect enemy battle fleets from great distances, a proclamation 
which elicits a “tremendous applause” from members of the High Senate (56). Brecht 
purposefully highlights the uses of science for destructive means due to the capitalist aim of 
accumulating wealth. However, Galileo gleans no satisfaction from this work; he later asks 
Sagredo, “How can I work, with the tax collector on the doorstep?” and continues, “If only I 
could have five years to do nothing but research!” (61). The character does not absentmindedly 
offer scientific inventions to those in power; his economic standing necessitates it. The work he 
performs for the upper class means that he “does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not 
feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy,” another result 
of the alienation of the worker (Marx, Economic 30). Rather than researching new scientific 
ideas which contest the Church’s orthodoxy, Galileo must pander to members of the upper class. 
The bourgeois system in which he lives reduces him to a brain for their purposes, not a man 
beholden to the lower classes of society who could employ his intellect to inspire social change. 
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Moreover, even though he offers scientific inventions to those in power, the upper class 
primarily decides the applications of that technology.  
As a member of the oppressed class in his society, Galileo also encounters extremely 
pervasive restrictions upon his ability to voice dissenting thoughts in public, resembling the 
circumstances of the real scientific community that developed the atomic bomb in the United 
States. At the beginning of the play, for example, the Curator tells Galileo that he may travel to 
Florence if he wishes to make money, but no matter where he goes, “eventually [he] will be 
forbidden to think—in the name of the Inquisition” (Brecht, Galileo 53). Under the Inquisition’s 
complete dominion, personal agency is seemingly outlawed from society; people cannot even 
express thoughts that differ from the dominant ideology of the ruling system, let alone partake in 
resistant action. This comment suggests that governing bodies or institutions derive their power, 
in part, from the eradication of free thought which disrupts their assumed authority. By that same 
token, if a person such as Galileo uses their own independent reasoning, they can shake the 
foundation on which the authority stands, possibly causing it to crumble, an outcome which the 
Church cannot risk. In Rome, an official of the Church named Cardinal Bellarmin cautions 
Galileo, “It is not given to man to know the truth: it is granted to him to seek after the truth. 
Science is the legitimate and beloved daughter of the Church. She must have confidence in the 
Church” (Brecht 79). Bellarmin’s decree and the Curator’s comment make it abundantly evident 
that the Church authorities will not tolerate free thought which does not adhere to their orders; 
compliance with the Church is once again completely assumed. Society does not own scientific 
discoveries, because the scientific community conducts everything in the name of the Holy 
Church. This fact makes the nature of the authority in the play especially problematic as it 
subordinates all other aims of science or social movements to the supreme power of a divine 
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entity. At another point in the play, a ballad singer in the streets repeatedly muses to a crowd, 
“For independent spirit spreads like foul diseases, / People must keep their place, some down and 
some on top” (Brecht 100). These lyrics highlight the class struggle between the proletariat and 
bourgeoisie in the play as well as the notion that the public, including scientists such as Galileo, 
must obediently follow the instructions and beliefs of the Church without “spreading” their 
independent reasoning, a concept mirrors the pressures placed on the scientific community that 
helped create the atomic bomb for the United States government. As a citizen under a repressive 
regime, Galileo is not permitted to think with his own conscience or contest the beliefs of the 
Catholic Church in any manner, which severely inhibits his ability to control the applications of 
his discoveries.  
This limitation of autonomous reasoning is what S.S. Schweber, author of the novel In 
the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer, and the Moral Responsibility of the Scientist, 
pinpoints as the downfall of the nuclear arms race. Schweber engages with Immanuel Kant’s 
idea of Enlightenment, which distinguishes between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ use of reason as 
previously mentioned (29). In circumstances that require a person to perform duties of a “civil 
post or office,” such as an officer of the law, a pastor, or even a scientist, Kant argues that the 
‘private use’ of reason can be limited without precluding the future enlightenment of generations 
(601). As a member of society, every citizen must abide by certain civic obligations; these duties 
might include paying taxes, following laws, or serving on a jury. In the interest of moving 
toward public ends for the community as a whole, governing bodies may require people within 
‘civic’ positions to obey orders with minimal or no opposition so as not to obstruct those ends. 
Serving as an appointed judge in a court of law, for example, a person is expected to adhere to 
the established judicial procedures of a sovereign. As a judge, the person operates under 
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instructions of another entity and cannot dispute the legal system in a court of law without 
obstructing justice. Within the role of a ‘scholar,’ on the other hand, Kant asserts that people 
must be allowed to use their reason freely in public, speaking out against injustices or other 
issues they find in society. Acting outside of a civic role, as a member of their community or the 
larger world community to which they belong, a person can openly share their own “carefully 
examined and well-intentioned thoughts” with the rest of the public for everyone to judge for 
themselves (602). Kant finds no qualms with an authoritative figure who demands obedience; the 
enlightenment of society, based on Kant’s theory, hinges only upon “the freedom to make public 
use of one’s reason in all matters” (601). The confidential nature of the Manhattan Project, as 
Schweber explains, restricted the scientists’ ability to use their reason freely in public as 
‘scholars,’ until it was too late.  
The issue, then, becomes one of transparency, or a lack thereof, on the government’s part, 
which prevents individuals who work in a ‘civic’ capacity on these types of classified projects 
from protesting the misuse of science for destructive means. Moreover, it does not follow 
logically that a governing body can make a legitimate claim to serve the common interests of 
people in society when, in situations that concern national safety, it forcefully conceals 
information about its motives and aims from those whom it allegedly represents or protects. One 
might argue that disclosure of such sensitive information would only induce widespread panic, 
jeopardize the ‘progress’ (a term which has already proven troublesome for the disenfranchised 
lower classes) of society as a whole, or cause a host of other problems for a nation. Let us 
consider, however, the greater threat to humankind in not allowing people in society to weigh in 
upon these decisions which affect every person who stands to suffer as a result. This touches 
upon interesting questions about the ambiguous term ‘social responsibility’ as well. Does social 
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responsibility mean concealing information in the supposed ‘public interest’7 of a nation? Or 
does social responsibility mean ensuring ethical decisions? The atomic bombings, as only one 
example of state-sanctioned violence, show us that it should also refer to the latter. In the past 
decade, the practice of “whistleblowing” has set a precedent for people bringing public attention 
to corrupt or unethical activities of organizations and political institutions in the private or public 
sector.8 Unfortunately, while protective legislation exists, people who participate in this act can 
still face social stigmas, loss of employment, and legal consequences, including criminal charges 
(Poon 89). Again, we see that the responsibility of guiding scientific pursuits in an ethical 
manner cannot fall on the shoulders of any single individual. In many cases, institutions thwart 
people from examining important ethical and social questions, a factor for which we must also 
hold political systems or institutions accountable.  
On a larger scale, the Holy Roman Church, and specifically the looming threat of the 
Inquisition, vehemently denies Galileo or any other individual the opportunity to use reason 
freely in public to dispute the Church’s actions. At the beginning of the play, we discover that 
Galileo teaches students about astronomy in the privacy of his own home, perhaps because he 
cannot do so in a public setting where his instructions would seem too controversial. When 
Galileo speaks to one of his students, Andrea, about their lessons, he plainly states, “I wouldn’t 
talk about our ideas outside,” then responds to Andrea’s confusion by elaborating, “Certain of 
the authorities won’t like it” (Brecht, Galileo 50). During a conversation with Sagredo, Galileo 
also suggests that God lies “within ourselves...or—nowhere,” to which Sagredo nervously 
                                               
7 In “A Justification of Whistleblowing,” Manohar Kumar and Daniele Santoro discuss the ubiquity of 
this term in politics, but explain that few concretely define it (676). 
8 Kumar and Santoro provide a tentative definition of “whistleblowing” as “the act of disclosing 
information from a public or private organization with the purpose of revealing cases of professional 
misconduct, or the violation of democratic procedures, that are of immediate or even potential danger to 
the public interest” (669-670). 
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replies, “Ten years ago, a man was burned at the stake for saying that,” because he recognizes 
the sacrilegious nature of the ideas that Galileo carelessly implies (62-63). Although Galileo 
believes he can provide undeniable proof to support his unconventional theories, Sagredo 
incredulously asks, “Do you really believe proof will make any difference?” (63). From this 
ominous exchange, we grasp the enormous risk Galileo faces if he voices his reason too boldly in 
public; the Inquisition will punish him for compromising their position of power, regardless of 
the evidence. As a public intellectual or ‘scholar’ within his society, Galileo cannot share 
dissenting attitudes against the Church’s hegemony aloud in public, which demonstrates his 
precarious position as an intellectual who deeply holds controversial beliefs, but cannot raise 
embarrassing questions about society without endangering himself.  
More significantly, the play illustrates the enormous difficulty, if not impossibility, of a 
person opposing those who enforce restrictions upon the public use of reason within society. We 
witness these obstacles as Galileo confronts the group of scholars, whom Sagredo aptly calls 
“court monkeys,” in Florence; this group of intellectuals dutifully serves the interests of the 
Church without any reservations (Brecht, Galileo 64). Opposed to these scholars, Galileo does 
not shy away from exploring new ideas that do not align with the Church’s orthodoxy. For 
example, Galileo begs the philosophers and mathematicians to peer through his telescope, which 
would enable them to observe the distant stars in the universe, but none of them will listen to 
him. One mathematician even suspects fraud, implicitly accusing Galileo of painting the stars on 
the lens of the telescope. The group of scholars’ refusals to entertain new discoveries 
demonstrates the safeguarding of “old teachings,” and most importantly ignorance, that occurs in 
an immature society. Kant posits that these “precepts and formulas” of sorts function to entrap 
individuals in a state of permanent minority (600). Rather than accepting the reason of a fellow 
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scholar, the group maintains the “authority” of two-thousand-year-old teachings, perpetuating a 
state of minority and the Church’s rule. Not only do they refuse to acknowledge Galileo’s 
evidence, but they relentlessly mock his theories which counter the Church’s upheld beliefs, 
specifically the Copernican model of the universe. After Galileo’s failed demonstration of the 
telescope, moreover, some of the scholars and religious figures begin treating him as a heretic. 
One of the monks calls the telescope a “diabolical” instrument, and an old cardinal crassly refers 
to Galileo as an “enemy of mankind” for suggesting that the earth, and therefore humankind, lies 
on the “outskirts” of the universe with other planets (73). The hostility with which the group of 
scholars and religious officials greet Galileo in Florence signifies the danger and difficulty which 
individuals face when confronting these ‘guardians,’ as Kant terms them, of minority. Kant 
argues that this presence of danger, however, is illusory to a degree, an intimidation tactic to 
discourage people from seeking a state of enlightenment on their own (600). In Galileo’s case, 
the repeated allusions to Giordano Bruno—a man burned alive at the stake for voicing his 
dissenting opinions—tell us otherwise. Even though Galileo attempts to introduce revolutionary 
ideas, we understand the very real danger the Catholic Church poses to his life. 
In every implicit or explicit association between Galileo and Giordano Bruno throughout 
the play, Brecht intensifies the imminent peril in which the character places himself by merely 
speaking or acting against the Church’s authority. On several occasions, when Galileo tells other 
characters about his unorthodox theories, the playwright suggests the gruesome fate that awaits 
him if he continues to spout out his ideas. As Galileo considers moving to Florence, for example, 
Sagredo speculates that his friend is “traveling the road to disaster,” then expresses that Galileo’s 
insistence on pursuing controversial truths about science will lead to his persecution; he 
anxiously exclaims, “A moment ago, when you were at the telescope, I saw you tied to the stake, 
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and when you said you believed in proof, I smelt burning flesh!” (Brecht, Galileo 65). Later, 
when Galileo interacts with the court officials and scholars in Florence, the Old Cardinal gives 
validity to Sagredo’s concerns, telling Galileo that he “bear[s] a striking resemblance to the man 
[the Inquisition] burned,” whose name eludes him (73). Even without saying Giordano Bruno’s 
name, the character’s observation, or thinly veiled threat, conjures the harrowing mental image 
of a person burning on the stake and forces us to imagine Galileo in this scenario. At another 
point, Galileo displays an awareness of this risk, but exhibits a somewhat cavalier attitude about 
it. The scientist rather sardonically tells his assistant, Federzoni, that he “cannot afford to be 
smoked on a wood fire like a ham” before he decides to publish his theory against the Church’s 
writ in the same scene (89). Evident in the character’s remark, he does not yet fully comprehend 
the gravity of his position as an enemy of the Church; nor does he seem to register the physical 
suffering which a person in this situation would endure. By downplaying the threat to Galileo’s 
life, the playwright encourages us to disregard the pain involved in such a personal sacrifice as 
well. Unfortunately for Brecht’s idea of an unflinchingly resolute public intellectual, the 
playwright ensures that we cannot view Galileo’s actions without also picturing the almost 
certain death he will face at the hands of the authorities should he not comply with the Church’s 
orders. 
On top of this danger, we see the pervasive state of minority which holds an unrelenting 
grip over people in Galileo’s society through descriptions of the lives of minor characters. To 
convince Galileo that he cannot refute the Church’s belief system, for example, the character 
named Little Monk describes his parents’ rote lives to the scientist: “They scrape a living, and 
underneath their poverty there is a sort of order. There are routines. The routine of scrubbing the 
floors, the routine of the seasons in the olive orchard, the routine of paying taxes. The troubles 
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that come to them are recurrent troubles” (Brecht, Galileo 83). As individuals under the 
oppressive rule of the Catholic Church, Little Monk’s parents accept barely gaining enough to 
survive and leading unfruitful lives, reduced to never-ending routines. In Marxist terms, the 
characters remain completely alienated from the wealth of their own labor, to an even greater 
extent than Galileo. We see the “precepts and formulas” that Kant discusses in full effect as they 
function to prevent people in the lower classes of society, such as Little Monk’s parents, from 
implementing their reason to escape the “routines” of their repetitive lives. Instead of thinking 
for themselves, Little Monk’s parents suffer under the instructions of the ‘guardians’ of society 
who tell them what to think and what to do. In Little Monk’s eyes, there would be “no meaning 
in [their] misery” if Galileo disproves that the earth is the center of the universe, fixed perfectly 
where God can overlook their suffering and reward them in Heaven (84). However, rather than 
shifting the blame onto the characters’ parents, who foolishly view their suffering and lack of 
fortune as pious, Little Monk’s powerful speech reveals that the spiritual order the Church 
imposes gives a sense of meaning to their lives, otherwise reduced to nothing but alienating 
labor. The character then correctly pinpoints what is at stake in unmooring the Catholic Church’s 
religious doctrine, which the ‘guardians’ of society help enforce: social order. If this belief in the 
Catholic Church’s assumed authority no longer existed, as Little Monk suggests, his parents 
would revolt and struggle against the status quo, fighting to better their conditions in their current 
world, rather than patiently awaiting their rewards in the next one. Even Little Monk fears 
disturbing his parents’ “peace” by supporting Galileo’s theories, because he believes it will bring 
them emotional and spiritual pain by overturning that order. The Church’s imposed religious 
teachings render the community of scholars and society in the play momentarily incapable of 
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using their independent reason to contest the social order, but more significantly, their authority 
presents an almost insurmountable obstacle for people such as Galileo who endeavor to try.  
Regardless of this threat, the climactic scene in which Galileo finally recants reinforces 
the notion that individuals should remain stalwart in their resistance against repressive systems. 
Brecht never actually allows the audience to see, with their own eyes, the intimate moment when 
the Holy Inquisition shows Galileo the torture instruments which scare him into submission. 
Instead, the scene in which he recants opens with a poem that resonates with regret for society: 
“June twenty second, sixteen thirty three, / A momentous day for you and me. / Of all the days 
that was the one / An age of reason could have begun” (Brecht, Galileo 111); the entire Age of 
Reason rests on Galileo’s shoulders in this moment. Outside in the garden, Galileo’s friends 
anxiously await the announcement that their colleague and teacher did not recant. One of his 
closest friends, Andrea, confidently insists, “Man is constant in the face of death,” then exclaims, 
“Beaten humanity can lift its head. A man has stood up and said No” (113). The character 
expresses all the heroic expectations which the playwright places on the scientist. When the town 
crier emerges in the street to read Galileo’s renouncement of his theories, their hope quickly 
turns into despair. Rather than describing the intense emotional or physical degradation of 
Galileo, the individual under repression, Brecht highlights the disappointment of the 
protagonist’s friends. Andrea symbolically states, “Unhappy is the land that breeds no hero,” 
implying that Galileo was the hero who needed to sacrifice his life for the noble truth of 
scientific discoveries and resist the authorities (115). Narrowly escaping a gruesome execution 
does not satisfy Galileo’s friends, all of whom thoroughly shame him for his defeat. When the 
scientist enters the scene, nobody even acknowledges his presence. After noticing him, Andrea 
states, “I can’t look at him. Tell him to go away,” then observes that Galileo managed to “save 
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his big gut,” once again admonishing his “selfish” motivations (114). This portrayal foregrounds 
the importance and responsibility of individuals such as Galileo to resist oppressive systems, 
leaving the impossible situation the individual faces in the background, which we cannot ignore.  
The character’s process of dehumanization under the Holy Inquisition’s interrogation 
demonstrates the sheer brutality repressive systems can employ when individuals threaten their 
power, which strips personal agency from even the most devout people. Brecht focuses 
extensively on Galileo’s revolutionary mindset early in the play, which stresses the deterioration 
the character undergoes. After Little Monk describes his parents’ lives, for example, Galileo 
cannot fathom their submission to the Church; he shouts, “No! No! No! As much of the truth 
gets through as we push through. You talk about the Campagna peasants as if they were the moss 
on their huts...I can see their divine patience, but where is their divine fury?” (Brecht, Galileo 
85). These lines convey the scientist’s utter outrage over the obedience of those in society who 
lead humble lives without questioning the ruling class’s authority or the social order. At another 
point, Galileo also proclaims his staunch commitment to knowledge, boldly stating, “I think I 
would let them imprison me in a place a thousand feet beneath the earth, where no light could 
reach me, if in exchange I could find out what that stuff is: ‘Light’” (86). When the Holy 
Inquisition interrogates Galileo in Rome for his heretic endeavors, however, his convictions 
utterly diminish in the face of possible death or torture. When he finally reappears from the 
literal torture chamber, the character is “changed, almost unrecognizable” after the experience 
(114). Years later, Galileo admits to his student, Andrea, the reason he submitted to the 
authorities: “I recanted because I was afraid of physical pain” (122). Douglas Kellner explains 
that Brecht’s Marxist aesthetic attempts to demonstrate how bourgeois society’s “environment 
influence[s], shape[s], and often batter[s] and destroy[s] the characters,” which we clearly see in 
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Galileo’s transformation (4). Regardless of the character’s tireless devotion to science, to the 
truth which could free those in society such as Little Monk’s parents, the threats of the Church 
and the possibility of torture force him to betray his passions, beliefs, and whole life’s work in a 
single moment. The repressive regime under which he lives effectively batters and destroys a 
brilliant physicist, converting him into nothing more than a body that only desires to avoid an 
excruciatingly painful death.  
 
Conclusion 
 How can the actions of a person in the seventeenth century, in a play rewritten during the 
twentieth century, possibly hold any bearing on our understanding of events today? Simply, 
literature can impact our perception of the world at any given time, and sometimes, motivate us 
to change it. With a playwright such as Brecht, that is never truer. But how do we reconcile the 
glaring contradiction between the playwright’s intention to end violence in society and the way 
he dismisses the violence against the individual in the play? To overlook violence, under any 
circumstances, can only lead to more violence. Ironically, the playwright dehumanizes the main 
character in a similar way that the oppressive system in the play does. The title change of the 
second version from Leben des Galilei (Life of Galileo) to Galileo perfectly illustrates this point. 
Brecht reduces the human experiences of a real person to a rhetorical device, a symbol at once 
emblematic of a social movement and a failure of individuals to fulfill the goals of that 
movement. In essence, the playwright performs the role of the Inquisitor, who interrogates the 
character’s crimes and exacts his punishment for all of us to witness.  
It is tempting to look for an easy solution, to expect people to defeat the “villains” of the 
world and save the day, but that is never a simple feat. In refocusing the lens through which we 
interpret the play, we see Galileo not as a mere symbol, but as a victim of violence in an 
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oppressive system. His actions are not due to mere shortcomings, but systematic problems which 
we still face. Even though individuals comprise systems and institutions, those forms of power 
often create several obstacles that prevent people from raising their voice to challenge their 
authority. We have seen the extensive measures that repressive systems and structural forms of 
power can take to restrict a person’s ability to resist. In varying degrees, institutions enforce 
limitations upon the use of free thought in public. People cannot always speak openly about 
mistakes or unethical decisions they believe an institution, political or religious in nature, is 
committing.  
Throughout the play, Galileo finds himself facing the possibility of physical torture and 
the ultimate sacrifice if he does not submit to the authorities. With the scientists who worked on 
the atomic bomb in the United States, the government imposed less dire, yet nevertheless rigid, 
limitations which allowed the atomic bombs to decimate thousands of human lives in a fell 
swoop before the individual scientists or the public could ever share any concerns about this 
decision. The government’s lack of transparency raises an important question about the 
legitimacy of confidentiality. Confidentiality can make it difficult for individuals to ensure that 
governments represent the people it allegedly serves. On a larger scale, it also presents obstacles 
that prevent people from ensuring ethical decisions which impact the world community to which 
we all belong. While the public use of reason may not inevitably lead to a fair moral judgement 
in all cases, it would enable everyone in society to hold each other, as well as the systems which 
they comprise, accountable for enacting violence against other human beings.  
Furthermore, the play provides an important criticism of bourgeois society which exploits 
and alienates people. For the exploited workers of the lower class, the necessity to earn a living 
wage can distract people from looking beyond their jobs and confronting injustices or social 
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inequalities. Moreover, the capitalist aim of monetary gain frequently outweighs the need to 
consider the ramifications of misusing technology. Knowledge is never neutral. There is always 
the potential for someone to exploit it, on an individual or institutional level. The atomic bomb 
serves as only one hideous example, but we do not need to look far into the past to find countless 
others. The issue of gun violence prompts many people to claim, “Guns don’t kill people, people 
do,” but this absurd notion oversimplifies the factors which allow people to mass produce 
weapons for a profit and consumers to easily access them. Combat drones now let us destroy 
entire villages without individuals ever coming face to face with the “enemy.” This alienation 
which occurs in bourgeois society allows individuals to feel completely disconnected from the 
violence we inflict upon each other with the ‘products’ of people’s minds. 
It is not only unreasonable, but ineffective to expect one person to change an entire 
system alone. Despite the playwright’s implication that people in society learn to doubt public 
intellectuals instead of the authorities because of Galileo’s actions, we understand that that is not 
the case. The ballad singers cry out “Bible-killer!” in the streets long before Galileo’s character-
defining moment, for the playwright, when he decides to recant. We can realize there will always 
be those in society who cling to the established truths and order, who refuse to listen to new or 
different ideas, but this should not discourage us from raising the important questions that shake 
things up. It merely proves that we must, at all times, examine the reasons people do not or 
cannot prevent injustices in society. If we are to understand the exploitation of scientific 
advancements for destructive means or hope to prevent acts of violence in the future, we must 
demand accountability from systems as well as individuals in society. Finally, we should always 
criticize representations of violence that, unwittingly or not, perpetuate violence.  
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